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The art of crisis management, now widely
acknowledged to be the essence of statecraft, owes
its vogue to the merger of politics and spectacle.
Propaganda seeks to create in the public a chronic
sense of crisis, which in turn justifies the
expansion of executive power and the secrecy
surrounding it. The executive then asserts his
"presidential" qualities by conveying his
determination to rise to crisis, whatever the
crisis of the moment happens to be - to run risks,
to test his mettle, to shrink from no danger, to
resort to bold and decisive action even when the
occasion calls for prudence and caution (Lasch
1985: 78).
Much of the contemporary debate on the transition from an apartheid to
an apartheid free South Africa has primarily focussed on the question of
class alliances and the possibility of socialism. This literature has
not, in any detail, discussed the nature of the apartheid state and the
prior question of how a transition is to be brought about. The
important debates concerning the role of the working class in alliance
with other classes do not put any suggestions " forward as to how the
apartheid state is to be transformed.
Recently, two positions on this question have emerged. First, John Saul
(1986: 3-22) makes some interesting arguments concerning the
relationship between the popular democratic and proletarian themes in
the liberation struggle and the way they are reflected in the liberation
movements. However, on the question of transition, Saul merely makes
vague references to the 'overthrow of the apartheid state', the
resistance movements 'forcing a transition to a democratic resolution of
South Africa's crisis' and 'the smashing of the apartheid state1. All
this is said in the context of his correct assertion that the 'brute
capacity of the state to bottle up the challenge (to it)...has not been
deeply threatened'.
Second, and more recently, Roger Southall (1987: 345-374) discusses the
possibility of socialism as well as other scenarios in a post-apartheid
South Africa. His argument is premised on the unclear assumption that a
transition has occurred 'not (by) the revolutionary overthrow of the
state but (by) its erosion from below'. Later on, he asserts that much
of the argument about the ongoing struggle concerns 'the strength of the
white state, and the supposition that it cannot be overthrown, only
eroded1.
The problem with both these positions, excluding their vagueness, is
that they do not seriously consider the institutional structure of the
South African state, its power and its tactical responses to the recent
wave of popular militancy in South Africa. In other words, the
mechanics of transition are not rigorously examined as these authors
have focussed their discussions on other themes, and it is to this
question, the question of transition and the state, that this paper is
directed. However, before examining the contemporary line up of forces
in the South African milieu, the way the liberation movements have
historically viewed the state and the tactics they they have adopted to
effect a transition will be discussed.
LENIN ON IMPERIALISM AND THE STATE
At least three different conceptions of imperialism can be identified in
Lenin's (1977: 634-731) Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism
(IHSC). First, imperialism is defined in terms of the mere seizure of
territory. The second version is also descriptive as imperialism is
depicted as the monopoly phase of capitalism where finance and
industrial capital have become fused. This view of imperialism is also
characterised in terms of capitalism in transition to socialism due to
the contradiction between the forces and relations of production being
held in check in the metropole by a strong and repressive state.
The third version of imperialism, also the most well known, attempts to
explain the relationship between the metropolitan and peripheral
countries. In this version, the contradiction between the forces and
relations of production is (temporarily?) resolved by the exporting of
capital to the colonies where it is possible to obtain raw materials and
labour-power cheaply facilitating the accumulation of super-profits
which, when repatriated, are used partly to buy off the militancy of the
most militant and enfranchised sectors of the metropolitan proletariat.
This implies that, unlike the second version of imperialism, the
metropolitan country is characterised by inter-class consensus due to
imperialist ideology on the need for the metropolitan country to oppress
and expliot the colony. Because profitability in the colony can only be
maintained by the political oppression of the indigenous peoples a
situation of 'national oppression1 arises. This results in resistance
which takes the form of rebellions or wars for national independence.
Thus, Lenin's IHSC does not contain a consistent definition of
imperialism nor an unambiguous view of conditions in the metropole. The
implications of this will become clear later.
While there are discrepancies in IHSC, there is no explicit theorization
of the state in the metropole or colony. Lenin, (1984: 1-114) however,
does theorize the state in State and Revolution (SR) although this
should not be seen as an attempt to redress the above mentioned lacunae.
Lenin's theory of the state is easily summarized. It is nothing more
than an instrument, a body of armed men, which the ruling class uses to
oppress the ruled clases. From this, a revolutionary strategy follows
whereby the dominated classes must seize and smash the state.
Parliamentary participation is seen to be pointless as the real affairs
of state occur behind the scenes while elections merely put into office
new representatives of the bourgeoisie who are intent on repressing the
masses. Finally in SR, Lenin endorses the second view of imperialism
with the state implementing repressive measures to maintain imperialism
in its highest stage.
Lenin (1977: 322) in Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder (LWC),
written some three years after SR, argues that although parliament from
the perspective of world history is obsolete, it still needs to be
overcome in practice. In this regard, Lenin advocates the participation
of the revolutionary party in parliament to achieve a certain objective.
He argues that because the party is weak and therefore unable to
overthrow these parliaments, by participating in them, it will be able
to change the consciousness of the masses who are duped into accepting
these institutions. This will result in the strengthening of the party
enabling the seizure of power. At no point does Lenin take the
institutional structure of parliament seriously and participation is
advocated as a tactic to win support for the seizure and smashing of
these institutions.
Lenin's views on the state, strategy and imperialism are important as,
with the rise of fascism in Europe, the Comintern (of which the
Communist Party of South Africa was a member) selectively read Lenin's
texts to analyse fascism as well as formulate a response binding on all
affiliated parties.
THE COMINTERN AND ANTI-FASCIST STRATEGY
Originally, the Comintern understood fascism to be caused by low levels
of economic development. However, with the emergence of fascism in
Germany, a country with a highly developed economy, the Comintern
revealed a volte face (cf Poulantzas 1974: 37-58). It now understood
fascism in terms of Lenin's second model of imperialism where monopoly
capitalism, characterised by the contradiction between the forces and
relations of production, was maintained by the brutal repression of the
working masses by the state. Thus, fascism was understood simply in
terms of increased repression by a state acting in the interests of
monopoly capital. In fact, the Comintern thought fascism to be
intrinsic to, and the logical outcome of, capitalist development in any
context.
Nonetheless, with this 'analysis' of fascism, the Comintern codified its
anti-fascist strategy at its Seventh Congress in 1935. Lenin's warnings
on parliamentary participation in SR were suspended and the
recommendations of LWC implemented. At the same time, the Comintern put
forward the idea of united and popular fronts (cf Poulantzas 1974:
163-4). The former referred to the co-operation of all working class
organisations while the latter referred to an alliance of the working
class and all other potentially democratic and anti-monopoly capital
classes including the peasantry and petite-bourgeoisie. The popular
front was to incorporate all those classes whose interests were
threatened by monopoly capital, the cause of fascism.
This new strategic direction of the Comintern had important
ramifications for the CPSA formed in 1921.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE AND STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE 1935 - 1960
Prior to this policy change, the CPSA had supported and implemented the
Comintern 1928 resolution concerning the establishment of independent
and anti-imperialist republics for colonial countries. Translated into
the South African context, this meant that the task of the revolution
was to overthrow the rule of the British and Boer imperialists and the
installation of a democratic and independent native Republic as a stage
towards the final overthrow of capitalism in South Africa (Simons and
Simons 1983: 390). However, as early as 1931, it appears as if the CPSA
had begun to implement the new policy directives of the Comintern which
were codified in 1935. The long term goal was still the overthrow of
Anglo-Boer imperialism but in the shorter term 'the first objective now
was to ward off fascism and war1 (Simons and Simons 1983: 478). While
it is clear that the CPSA adopted and implemented the Comintern's new
policy, it is necessary to examine how this policy was implemented and
the consequences that it had for local developments.
In 1925, Hertzog, as leader of the Pact Government which came to power
after the 1924 election, announced his intention to remove blacks from
the common voters roll in the Cape. This common voters roll began in
the mid Nineteenth Century (Trapido 1980: 247-274) and in order to
qualify, one had to be male, over the age of eighteen and a taxpayer.
Hertzog's Bill became law in 1936 at the same time that the 1913 Land
Act was modified against squatters on white owned farms. While blacks
were removed from the common voters roll, three new institutions were
established for them to make their wishes known to government (Roth
1986: 144) . Firs t, the Cape voters, who had been removed from the
common roll, could now elect three white representatives to the House of
Assembly. Second, the whole of the black electorate (that is, all males
over the age of eighteen who were taxpayers in South Africa) could vote
for four senators. Finally, this same electorate could also vote for
the Natives Representatives Council (NRC) whose function would be to
comment on all new legislation on black affairs. In other words, it was
only an advisory body.
Nonetheless, in 1935 when it became apparent that Hertzog's bills would
soon be passed into law, responses were formulated by the CPSA, African
National Congress (ANC) and Non European Unity Movement (NEUM) which
formed after a break-away from the CPSA (Alexander 1986: 3). This
resulted in the formation of the All African Convention (AAC) in
December 1935. At the same time, the League Against Fascism and War was
established to 'defend civil liberties and the democratic ideal'.
Simons and Simons (1983: 475) go on to argue that the CPSA's activities
concerning the League and AAC were in accordance with the Comintern' s
Seventh Congress of 1935. Thus, it would seem as if the League and AAC
would respectively focus on the European and local arenas.
The first elections for representatives to sit in these new
institutions, as well as the urban advisory boards was scheduled for
1937. A debate arose within the AAC over whether or not to participate
with the NEUM raising objections to participation on the grounds of
Hindu religious doctrine and class independence (Alexander 1986: 4). In
other words, the boycott, non-participation or anti-collaboration
tradition in South African extra-parliamentary politics can be traced
back to this point in time. Despite this disagreement within the AAC,
the CPSA and ANC participated with the latter getting three of its
members elected onto the NRC (Simons and Simons 1983: 497). The CPSA
justified its participation in the elections by arguing that it would be
better to have militants in these institutions who could then act in the
interests of, and consolidate among, their constituencies. Edwin
Mafutsanyana, commenting on advisory board elections, made this position
clear when he said that 'Radicals had blundered by allowing the urban
advisory boards to become the agents of white municipalities. The
proper course was to secure the election of militants who would conduct
a struggle against high rents, lodgers' permits, beer brewing and other
vexatious regulations' (in Simons and Simons 1983: 498). At the same
time, it was argued that an election boycott must be universal to be
effective. If candidates were elected in polls of one percent, they
would still hold office. Thus, it was best for militants to stand for
election who, when elected, could, as the Irish Republicans had done,
refuse to take their seats making the boycott total (Roux 1978: 298) .
On the other hand, the ANC participated in the NRC elections because of
its early history of sending deputations to government as well as
reports that the NRC would become a parliament for blacks (Roth 1986:
144).
In 1938, local events took a dramatic turn when the United Party (UP)
was elected into office. This had two important implications. First,
Smuts' pro-British policies resulted in the CPSA supporting him and the
war effort in an attempt to defend Russia from a German invasion.
Second, Smuts' pro-British stance led to the formation of the
Ossewa-Brandwag (OB) an Afrikaner pro-Nazi organisation which mobilized
support around the harsh experiences of the Anglo-Boer war. In any
event, by supporting and co-operating with the UP over the war effort,
the CPSA was acting in accordance with Comintern policy. However, this
European focus nearly caused a split in the CPSA as it was felt by
Mafutsanyana, the general secretary, that the party was losing support
as well as neglecting its role in the liberation front. He claimed that
the African people were betrayed by such action and that party meetings
were not well attended due to Africans being mainly concerned with the
oppression under which they lived (Simons and Simons 1983: 484).
In this regard, the twists in CPSA policy took a new turn. With the
Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939, the CPSA no longer supported the war in
Europe as Russia was no longer threatened (Roux 1978: 308). The party
therefore ceased co-operating with the UP government and began to focus
its attention on the African masses by, inter alia, campaigning against
their recruitment into the military. Thus, in June 1939, the central
committee of the CPSA argued that the fight against fascism understood
in terms of Afrikaner nationalism and its pro-Nazi implications should
begin at home. It is important to note that the CPSA did not explain
fascism in South Africa in terms of the contradiction between the forces
and relations of production. Instead, fascism was understood as the
importation and adaptation of Nazism to South Africa which was
attractive to existing anti-British Afrikaner sentiment (Simons and
Simons 1983: 483).
This turn to the African masses was, however, shortlived as Germany soon
attacked Russia and the CPSA reverted to its previous position of
supporting the UP. This redirection of attention towards the
international arena had important local consequences, one of which was
the consolidation of the non-collaboration grouping within the AAC
resulting in it affiliating to the NEUM.
The boycott position grew and' at the time of the 1942 NRC elections,
calls from within the ANC were made for non-participation. After the
elections, in which the ANC and CPSA participated with some success,
young intelectuals in the ANC formed the ANC-Youth League (ANC-YL) in
1943. The ANC-YL called for non-collaboration, boycotts and a programme
of positive action (Simons and Simons 1983: 546; Roth 1986: 157). The
debate over participation came to a head in 1946 when the NRC was
adjourned at the time of the mineworkers' strike never to be reconvened
although elections were scheduled for 1948. There was, however, no
unanimous decision in both the ANC and CPSA to adopt a boycott position
which was propogated by the ANC-YL (Roth 1986: 155). While the AAC did
not participate in the 1948 elections, sticking to its 1943 resolution
of a total boycott, the ANC and CPSA, for different reasons did put
candidates forward. The former modified its December 1947 boycott
resolution on the grounds that members of the NRC should be returned to
office while new councillors be elected on a boycott ticket. It was
also thought that to advise the electorate to abstain from voting would
create confusion in, and divide, the masses. The^ANC, in intensifying
the boycott campaign thought this to be the most effective way to attain
its objective (Simons and Simons 1983: 582). The latter reaffirmed its
criticism of non-participation arguing further that the vote was a right
not to be voluntarily suspended while advocating a boycott would enable
the government to abolish all aspects of franchise rights on the grounds
that blacks themselves did not want them (Roth 1986: 158).
These developments must be situated in the context of changes which had
come about after the Second World War had ended in 1945. With the
defeat of Hitler and the Soviet Union no longer threatened, the CPSA
joined other organisations in directing all its energy towards local
events. The main task which the CPSA set itself was to fight the NP
seen as fascist by implementing Comintern anti-fascist policy locally
(Turok 1972: 265). This meant supporting the UP, participating in
elections as well as working within black working class organisations
such as trade unions which had grown due to pre- and post war industrial
development. At its annual conference in January 1948, the CPSA
declared, inter-alia, that 'The primary aim of communists in the
forthcoming general election would be the bring about the defeat of the
pro-fascist Nationalist party1 (in Simons and Simons 1983: 582).
While the NP narrowly won the 1948 election, the CPSA, which was already
represented on the Cape Provincial Council, had its candidate Sam Kahn
elected to the House of Assembly under the amended Cape Native Franchise
Act. In 1949, in response to the NP's election, both the ANC and CPSA
announced their plans aimed at removing them from power. The CPSA, at
its annual conference, advocated a positive campaign both inside and
outside parliament emphasizing the role of mass struggle at all times
(in Turok 1972: 267-8). Thus, the CPSA had a flexible approach to
parliamentary politics while, at the same time, it had no illusions as
to what it on its own could achieve. It constantly stressed that the
boycott was a tactic and not a principle. On the other hand, the ANC,
at its annual conference, announced and adopted its Programme of Action
which stressed extra-parliamentary peaceful protest and passive
resistance along the lines of Ghandi's successful earlier anti-pass law
campaigns. This Programme of Action was the foundation for the Defiance
Campaign which began in 1952.
However, it soon became clear that the NP government intended to
proscribe the CPSA with its proposed Suppression of Communism Bill. The
CPSA, at its conference in 1950, decided to disband prior to the Bill
becoming law. But, before disbanding, the CPSA presented a new analysis
of South Africa. It was now argued that the 'distinguishing feature of
South Africa is that it combines the characteristics of both an
imperialist state and a colony within a single indivisible geographical,
political and economic entity'. This led to the conclusion that 'the
nationalist organisations must be transformed into a revolutionary party
of workers, peasants, intelectuals and petty bourgeoisie... in alliance
with the class conscious European workers and intelectuals' (in Davies
et al 1984: 283). While the popular front strategy is again reaffirmed,
other aspects of this conference resolution are most important. First,
the CPSA appears to have shifted from its analysis of fascism in South
Africa being an import and application of Nazism to South Africa by the
OB and NP. Instead, it now seems to explain fascism in South Africa in
terms of the Comintern analysis, which draws heavily from Lenin's IHSC.
This interpretation will be substantiated later when other documents are
analysed. Second, the conceputal framework for characterising South
Africa in terms of 'internal colonialism' or 'colonialism of a special
type' is set forth at the 1950 conference. Although the CPSA had
disbanded, many of its former members continued to work in black trade
unions while those who were members of the ANC as well devoted their
energies to that organisation.
The Supression of Communism Bill became law in 1950 and in 1952, it was
used to expel former CPSA members from the Cape Provincial Council and
House of Assembly. However, former CPSA members continued to stand for
election in the Cape Western constituency and on each occasion won while
the government used the Suppression of Communism Act in turn to remove
them from the House of Assembly. More importantly, 1952 marks the
state's response to the Defiance Campaign when it passed the Public
Safety Bill into law. . This legislation empowered the government to,
inter alia, declare a state of emergency and suspend existing
legislation.
In the midst of the Defiance Campaign was the impending 1953 House of
Assembly elections and the NP had announced its intentions to remove
' coloureds' in the Cape from the common voters' roll. Although the UP
had supported the NP in removing former CPSA members from parliament,
the passing of the Public Safety Act and the removal of 'coloured'
franchise rights, former communists continued to work with the UP. They
acknowledged that the UP, the only opposition party, was hardly an
alternative to the NP but argued that the immediate task of the struggle
was to defeat the most 'reactionary, extreme right-wing element in the
body politic of the country, namely the Nationalists...' (Yusuf Dadoo in
Advance 29/03/53) . Indeed, in 1953, former members of the CPSA decided
to reconstitute themselves and the South African Communist Party (SACP)
was formed and operated clandestinely until many of its members were
arrested at Rivonia in 1963.
While the events of the Defiance Campaign will not be recounted here (cf
Lodge 1983a:33-66) it is worth noting that the campaign articulated with
mass based resistance in the urban and rural areas (cf Lodge 1983a)
8which resulted from the government's attempts to impose betterment
schemes, its tampering with traditional tribal structures,
implementation of urban segregation policy and the imposition of passes
onto black women. The climax to all these events came in 1955 when the
Congress of the People accepted the Freedom Charter as the political and
economic programme for a post-apartheid South Africa. the momentum of
the masses and the liberation movements had slowed down somewhat after
the events of the mid 1950's but rapidly accelerated in i960 when both
the Pan African Congress (formed after Africanists had left the ANC in
1959) and ANC announced their anti-pass campaigns in December 1959. As
it turned out, the PAC's campaign, which began on 21 March 1960,
precipitated the crisis that was to lead to the state of emergency being
declared as well as the banning of both the PAC and ANC.
Such action by the state was to set a new phase of struggle in motion.
However, the state of emergency and the banning of the liberation
movements seemed to have been successful in halting the militancy of the
masses- The reasons for this are complex but two factors were possibly
very important. First, the liberation movements did not focus on grass
roots level organisation and consolidation. The 'M plan1 was advocated
in late 1953. It recommended that branches divide into cells, zones and
then wards (Lodge 1983a: 75). However, this plan was only implemented
in some parts of the Eastern Cape and Natal and in December 1955, the
National Executive of the ANC reported that agitation was still confined
to mass meetings and public gatherings while the building of small local
branches was important although not advanced (in Lodge 1983a: 75). Part
of the explanation as to why local organisation was neglected was the
shortage of people to do this worJ< as well as the lack of time due to
the speed and magnitude of events . Second, the aim of the liberation
movements had been to bring apartheid to an end and it was thought that
mass based extra-parliamentary protest would indeed disorganize the
system and make it unworkable. This would then facilitate a transition
to a non-racial and democratic society. The state, however, illustrated
its ability to withstand this assault as well as deal a severe blow to
the liberation movements forcing them to rethink strategy.
ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE STATE 1961 - 1987
On 16 December 1961, nearly two years after the Sharpeville crisis,
units of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) carried out bomb attacks against
government installations in major South African cities. This turn to
violent forms of struggle was not unanimously accepted by all the
members of the liberation movements. Indeed, there is some controversy
over the reasons for the turn to armed struggle (Lodge 1983a: 231-240;
Davis and Fine 1985). Nonetheless, it marked a new phase in the
liberation struggle accompanied by new conception of the state.
The sabotage campaign which began in 1961 and continued up to 1964 had a
threefold objective. First, to spur the masses on to continue the
momentum of the late 1950 's and early 1960 ps. Second, to set in
process, via mass based action, a guerilla operation. Third, it was
also an attempt to warn the government and its supporters that unless
they changed their policies, confrontation would be imminent (MK in
Carter et al 1977: 717). The ultimate aim of the liberation movements
was now the seizure and smashing of the state which acted in the
interests of whites and monopoly capital to enable a transition to a
state of national democracy.
These ideas were codified in the SACP's programme, The Road to South
African Freedom (RTF) adopted at its fifth underground conference held
in October 1962. In this document, the notion of internal colonialism
as sketched out in 1950 is used to characterise the South African social
formation. Thus, in RTF (nd: 28), the South African state is "On one
level, that of 'White South Africa1 , there are ail the features of an
advanced capitalist state in its final stage of imperialism. There are
highly developed monopolies and the merging of industrial and finance
capital . . . But on another level, that of 'Non-White South Africa1,
there are all the features of a colony. The indigenous population is
subject to extreme national oppression, poverty and exploitation..." RTF
goes on to argue that like imperialist rule elsewhere, the state relies
solely on brute force and violence to maintain itself and the interests
it represents. The cohesion of the white bloc is explained in terms of
the white working class being a labour aristocracy who have been
incorporated into an alliance with the monopolists by their receipt of
rewards accrued from the super - profits derived from the exploitation
of the non-whites. Consequently, RTF argues that there is a large
degree of consensus in the white bloc with white workers having the vote
while real power lies in the hands of the monopolists. This results in
the state moving "increasingly towards the pattern of fascism: an open
terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary and racialist section of
capitalists" (RTF nd: 3). Change, therefore can come about only by the
overthrow of the 'colonialist state of white supremacy1.
It is clear that the ideas in Lenin's IHSC and SR as well as the
Comintern's analysis of fascism have informed RTF. In this regard, the
ambiguities in these texts have been reproduced in RTF. First, RTF
implies that there is consensus in the white nation (metropole) while at
the same time characterising the state as fascist suggesting that all
non-monopoly classes are oppressed. RTF (nd: 52) even mentions the
possibility of an alliance of all democratic and anti-monopoly classes.
Second, and more importantly, RTF merely describes South Africa using
Leninist categories, that is, it uses ideas present in the second and
third model of imperialism in Lenin's IHSC to categorise South Africa.
At no point does it explain why the South African social formation has
taken its particular form. Lenin, in the third model, explains the
relationship between metropole and colony in terms of the export of
capital. However, because South Africa has these features in one
geographic area, it cannot be argued that the crisis has been exported
onto the 'black-nation' as capital, following the logic of Lenin's
arguement, is exported out of the country. It is in this context that
Wolpe's (1972, 1975, 1980a) cheap labour-power thesis becomes important
because it attempts to explain the specific nature of South Africa by
using the migrant labour system and its functionality to capital as the
mechanism which explains the relationship between the 'black and white
nations'.
Nonetheless, what is important in RTF is the conceptualisation of the
state as a tool for maintaining monopoly domination which must be seized
as 'a mere change of government to another section of the white ruling
class would make superficial concessions, while leaving the essence of
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the colonial system and monopoly control intact1 (RTF nd: 51). In other
words, the idea of prioritizing the removal of the NP from power as in
the mid 1950' s has been replaced by the notion of the destruction of
white domination.
While RTF (nd: 54) vaguely mentions the formation of guerilla armies to
undertake armed resistance which will 'culminate in a mass insurrection
against white domination1, Operation Mayibuye (OM) (in Carter et al
1977: 761) puts forward a detailed plan for the implementation of a full
scale guerilla war. OM had not been accepted by the MK High Command
when the document was discovered by the police at Rivonia in mid 1963.
The arrest of the leadership of the liberation movements occurred at the
same time as the Poqo insurrection in the Eastern Cape . However, the
subsequent collapse of the liberation movement's underground structure
meant that the struggle had to be planned by those who had previously
left the country and those who went into exile. It was only after
organisational consolidation in exile that the liberation movements
attempted to implement the strategy of guerilla warfare as set out in
OM. The object was for guerillas to infiltrate into South Africa and
consolidate among the rural population while sabotaging state and
economic institutions throughout South Africa so that the armed forces'
capacity to protect such institutions would be limited. With the
weakening of the state and the strengthening of the masses the seizure
of power was thought to be possible.
In 1967, guerillas on their way to South Africa were intercepted by
Rhodesian security forces and the mission not only failed but it also
resulted in South Africa sending members of its police force to Rhodesia
to prevent future attempted incursions . Despite the failure of this
mission, this noton of guerilla warfare was still considered valid and
was codified in the ANC's Strategy and Tactics Of the South African
Revolution (ST) accepted as policy at Morogoro in 1969. Furthermore,
not only is the internal colonialism characterisation of South Africa
reaffirmed in ST, but the idea of the seizure of the state now
understood as combining repressive and ideological aspects is presented.
This is importatn because ST (1972: 190-198) appears to follow the theme
in Lenin's IHSC that national oppression necessarily results in
resistance when it asserts that 'It is naive to believe that oppressed
and beleaguered people cannot be temporarily , even in large numbers, be
won over by fears, terror, lies, indoctrination, and provocation....'
and 'the nationaal sense of grievance is the most potent revolutionary
force which must be harnessed'. Thus, because the theoretical analysis
of South Africa in terms of internal colonialism is thought to grasp the
reality of the situation it is thought that the masses would be
receptive to the guerillas who would then act as a catalyst enabling
latent conflict to manifest itself in the form of a mass based struggle
for national liberation .
Despite the obvious Hegelian undertones of this analysis and its
voluntaristic implications, later attempts by guerillas to enter and
consolidate in South Africa seem to have been unsuccessful and the
decade between Rivonia and 1973 probably marks the nadir of the exile
liberation movements. However, as Nolutshungu (1982: 147) points out,
'the emergence of the black consciousness movement (BC) was perhaps the
single most important development in the internal politics of South
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Africa in the period 1967-76' . While the relationship between BC and
the exile movements is unclear, there can be little doubt as to the
effect which BC had in setting in motion a new phase of struggle in
South Africa. At the same time, the consequences of the Durban strikes
of the early 1970's which were probably caused by low wages and high
inflation (Du Toit 1981: 247) cannot be underestimated. Nonetheless,
the Soweto uprising of 1976 (Kane-Berman 1978, Hirson 1979) and the
subsequent spread of urban rebellion in South Africa is pivotal in
making sense of more recent oppositional strategic thinking as well as
state restructuring and tactics. Before drawing out these implications,
Slovo's South Africa - No Middle Road (NMR) written in 1975 needs to be
discussed.
Slovo (1976: 32) acknowledges that 'internal colonialism1 is a
convenient shorthand for describing the South African social formation
while he explains racial domination in terms of the continuity of
colonial institutions in a modern industrial economy. He does not,
however, explain how and why the modern industrial economy modifies and
preserves _ these institutions and their symbiotic relationship is
asserted rather than demonstrated as Wolpe attempts to do. This
reciprocal and mutually reinforcing view of the relationship between
race and class has important repercussions for Slovo's analysis of the
state. As Wolpe (1980b: 10) points out, within such a perspective, any
state restructuring or constitutional change necessarily implies £ fine
tuning of the system of racial oppression and class exploitation . In
other words, the effects of state restructuring are known is advance and
therefore do not need to be analysed despite the way such restructuring
redefines the political terrain for the opposition. Such a view has
recently been presented by Denga (1985: 71) who claims that the
proposals of monopoly capital and the idea of power sharing (that is
recent state reform initiatives) simply mark the modification and
perfection of colonial relations as opposed to their destruction.
Ultimately, such a view of the state suggests an oppositional strategy
premised upon the organisation of the masses outside of state structures
(if this is at all possible) for the overthrow of the state.
While these theoretical debates are most important, the events of the
last quarter of the 1970's were dramatic. With the student and township
rebellions, and the efflux of youths out of the country to join the
exiled liberation movements, an internal and receptive mass base for
opposition politics emerged and the strategy of 'armed propaganda' was
implemented (Lodge 1983b). It aimed to popularize the liberation
movements and establish internal structures by sabotaging institutions
or buildings which were symbolic of black oppression. This campaign
appears to have been successful and laid the foundation for a new phase
of guerilla and armed struggle in the mid 1980's when, due to grass
roots township rebellions over rents and the establishment of unpopular
local authorities by the government in 1982, the idea of 'people's war'
emerged (Lodge 1986a). It was now thought that internal political
opposition was sufficiently established after anti-local authority and
anti-tri-cameral parliament campaigns to train and arm people in the
communities as opposed to guerillas having to continuously infiltrate
into South Africa. Part of the reason for this new approach is that
natural conditions in South Africa are not conducive to classic models
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of guerilla warfare (OM: 761-2) but, at the same time, the possibility
of the South African security forces acting against bases in frontline
states meant that internal consolidation of organization was a
priority.
Clearly, the events of the mid-1980's mark the apex of the struggle for
national liberation. Community organisations had sprung up throughout
the country and unlike the 1950's, structures at street, local and area
level were consolidated. At the same time, national organisations such
as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and National Forum (NF) which
formed in response to the tri-cameral parliament and Koornhof bills
linked the community based uprisings into a national social movement.
Similarly, the independent trade union movement which had grown rapidly
in the mid 1970's and early 1980's made its presence felt in the
political arena by participating in broad and off the factory floor
campaigns. It is at this point that a crucial development seems to have
occurred in the exile movements' strategic thinking: the idea of a
negotiated settlement as opposed to the seizure of power emerges in
early 1985 (The Guardian Weekly 10/02/85). The ANC is reported to have
offered to suspend the armed struggle if the South African government
committed itself to meaningful talks. This view was reaffirmed by Tambo
in his 'Message From The National Executive Committee Of The ANC dated
January 8 1987 to mark the 75th Anniversary of the ANC where it was
stated that 'We reiterate our commitment to seize any opportunity that
may arise to participate in a. negotiated resolution of the conflict in
our country1 (Star 25/04/87) . This new' position on negotiations is
premised on the assumption that if the government does not enter into
negotiations, the armed struggle will continue with the objective of
forcing a negotiated settlement. The idea that the forces for change
must still be organised from without the state is still present in this
new position. Nonetheless, the significance of the emergence of
negotiations on the liberation movements' agenda will be discussed later
in the context of the Eminent Persons' Group (EPG) visit to South Africa
in early 1986.
RETHINKING THE STATE AND OPPOSITION
The object of the preceeding discussion has been to illustrate the
changes in strategy and tactics in the thinking of the liberation
movements. The most important change was that of the turn to armed
struggle in 1961 which was, in retrospect, justified in terms of
revolutionary as opposed to constitutional politics with the latter
fostering illusions (Slovo 1973: 325; Turok 1972: 282). In other words,
revoutionary forms of struggle were associated with the seizure of the
state while constitutional avenues were considered to be not only
ineffective but also a hinderance. This idea of relegating
constitutional forms of struggle to a lower level is reinforced by the
idea that all state restructuring is merely the 'fine-tuning' of the
system. In what follows, an alternative explanation of state
restructuring will be presented and the question of participation will
be raised.
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VERWOERD, VORSTER AND THE RISE OF BOTHA
Conventional analyses of the reform era of South Africa, that is recent
developments, tend to associate the impulse to reform with P.W. Botha
who emerged as the leader of the NP in 1978. However, in order to fully
comprehend the changes which have occurred, it is necessary to briefly
characterise the government and state of the Verwoerd and Vorster eras.
The Verwoerd administration (1958-66) was, according to Giliomee (1983),
characterised by ideological clarity which was the result of the NP's
moral vision of separate development. At the same time, after
consolidating his power in the party, Verwoerd became an authoritarian
leader who forced through major changes. He was 'a towering
personality, he overruled ministers on departmental matters and in
general created the impression that he alone was making all the
decisions'. Moreover, under Verwoerd, the state bureaucracy reflected
the policy of separate development, with the establishment of
departments such as Bantu Administration, Coloured Affairs, Indian
Affairs, Community Development etc. while it became a stronghold of the
defenders of the policy. Verwoerd imbued the bureaucracy with his own
particular political vision and, according to one commentator,
'attracted not pliable servants but like-minded ideologues'. The
bureaucracy during the Verwoerd and Vorster governments remained
cohesive and committed to the policy of separate development and were
hostile to any attempts at reforming Verwoerdian blueprint. This point
is illustrated in the way Bantu Administration officials refused to
deviate from the policy of blacks being 'temporary sojourners' in
'white' South Africa when, with the help of M.C. Botha, the Minister of
Bantu Affairs, they obstructed the Urban Bantu Councils for which
legislation was passed in the early 1960's (Giliomee 1983: 227).
However, the most important changes in the state during the Verwoerd era
were the restructuring of the security and intelligence gathering
agencies. This process occurred mainly in response to the mass based
protests of the 1950's and early 1960's and the turn to armed struggle
although it later gathered a momentum of its own.
Between 1948 and 1963, the Special Branch of the Police was entrusted
with ensuring internal security. It was only in 1963, during Vorsters'
tenure as Minister of Justice, that the Security Police was established
under the leadership of Colonel van den Bergh who was nominated by
Vorster and approved by Verwoerd (Grundy 1983: 12). Soon after the
establishment of the Security Police, a new clandestine body was set up.
Republican Intelligence (Rl). It was an extension of the Security
Police and was established to relieve it from the burden of intelligence
gathering. The head of RI was van den Bergh whose reputation, after
being transferred from the Security Police, grew with the growth of RI
as well as his close friendship with Vorster both of whom were interned
by the British during the Second World War.
The military in this period had not been a pivotal institution as the
police and security police were strengthened to act against threats to
the state. However, important developments did take place when the
Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) was established in 1960 and
when P.W. Botha became Minister of Defence in 1966. Recently, President
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Botha (SAUK TV NETWERK 29/05/88: 20H00 Hrs) in an interview recounted
how he was appointed to this post. He said he was summoned by Verwoerd
soon after the election and asked what portfolio he wanted. As he
already was the Minister of Community Development and Coloured Affairs
he suggested the Social Welfare and Pensions portfolio. P.W. Botha went
on to say that Verwoerd offered him the defence portfolio stating that
arms embargoes were expected and that local production in co-operation
with the private sector should begin. This, he said, marked the
beginning of Armscor. Soon after Botha's appointment as Minister of
Defence, Verwoerd was assassinated and B.J. Vorster became Prime
Minister, a post he held until 1978.
Vorsterps administration was very different to that of Verwoerd's.
Whereas Verwoerd asserted his authority in most spheres of
administration and policy formation, Vorster, according to Gilliomee
(1983: 202), granted the various departments of government a large
measure of autonomy. He adopted a "Chairman of the board" approach to
government while pursuing pragmatic, tentative and experimental policies
due to him not having a master plan as did Verwoerd. Furthermore,
Vorster's main concern was the maintenance of unity which was
established through a process of accumulating accord by patient
listening, persuasion and building of support.
Vorster's style of government had two important consequences. First, a
proliferation of cabinet committees, finally reaching twenty, at the
time of his replacement as Prime Minister. Secondly, and more
important, it facilitated the emergence of cliques within institutions
which resulted in intense inter-institutional tension and rivalry. This
is illustrated in the institutional restructuring of the security
apparatus. In 1969, the covert operations of RI came into the open when
the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) was established with van den Bergh
at the helm. Latent tensions and conflicts between it, DMI and the
Security Police became manifest. DMI thought that BOSS was trying to
assume control over it and BOSS did have a section for military
evaluation (Grundy 1983: 12). On the other hand, the Security Police
were concerned with BOSS' intrusion into their areas of operation and
its recruitment of Security Police personnel.
These interdepartmental conflicts, which had more to do with in-fighting
rather than different responses to social conflict as the 1960's and
early 1970's marks the nadir of black apposition politics, led to
Vorster appointing Justice H.J. Potgieter to head a Commission of
Inquiry. Potgieter recommended the establishment of a State Security
Council (SSC) which came into effect through the Security Intelligence
and State Security Council Act (No 64 of 1972). The SSC was empowered
to formulate and implement policy concerning the security of the
Republic and determine intelligence priorities. It was, in effect,
created to demarcate the spheres of activity of the various security
institutions thereby eliminating overlap and therefore conflict. In
this regard it failed as, in the same year of its establishment, DMI
(now renamed Military Intelligence Section, MIS) was empowered to engage
in covert counter-intelligence operations inside South Africa thereby
invading Security Police (and BOSS) turf (Grundy 1988: 43). Indeed the
conflicts between MIS and BOSS in particular and the Security Police
were aggravated and played out in the SSC. Officially, MIS was supposed
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to report to van den Bergh who was the Prime Minister's security
advisor. Instead, it circumvented the head of BOSS and reported
directly to P.w. Botha, the Minister of Defence, who in turn reported to
the SSC. This led to intense rivalry between Botha and van den Bergh
(Grundy 1983: 12).
In 1973, an investigation into the shortcomings of the state's security
machinery resulted in a report on the National Security Situation being
completed by the Public Service Commission in September 1975 (Grundy
1988: 52). Most of the recommendations of this commission were accepted
and included, inter alia, the establishment of an active security
management system to link national, interdepartmental, departmental and
subdepartmental levels of operation: a full time national security
staff; the creation of regional and area committees to facilitate
co-ordination and the identification of 15 functional areas of concern
within the security field with committees for each. The wide-ranging
areas covered virtually every facet of state policy, from culture to
civil defence, from economy to manpower (Grundy 1988: 53). Thus, the
National Security Management System which is closely connected to the
SSC and whose structure was set in place in 1979 has its origins in this
1975 report.
Another aspect of, or a factor aggravating, the conflicts between the
security apparatuses related to the differing views on foreign and local
policy. As early as 1967, Vorster, van den Bergh and the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) embarked upon the policy of detente in Africa and
began to establish diplomatic links with the newly independent states.
This strategy gathered momentum in the mid 1970's when the Department of
Information, using secret funds, began to aggressively marked South
Africa in cladenstine ways. In other words, foreign policy at this
stage revolved around 'seeking international support in return for
ideological compromise1 (Adam 1983: 75). On the other hand, the
Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, as early as March 1973 (the same year
Malan became Chief of the Army) in a White Paper on Defence articulated
the elements of total strategy. He identified South Africa as 'a target
for international communism and its cohorts — leftist activists,
exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism, and related
ideologies'. In addition, the RSA, for Botha, had been singled out as a
1
 special target for the by-products of their ideologies, such as black
racialism, exaggerated individual freedom, one-man-one-vote, and a host
of other slogans employed against us on basis of double standards' (RSA
1973: 1). In the context of this 'global back-ground', Botha outlined
the basis upon which the Government was developing its policy. He
stated that 'Traditionally a country's policy structure comprises of
three basic elements — internal policy, foreigh policy, and defence
policy. The last is determined by the preceding two, but these, in
turn, cannot be developed properly unless they are sustained by a sound
and adequate defence policy'.
This emphasis on defence was important because defence policy was seen
in terms of 'offensive' defence as illustrated by the Angolan
intervention in 1975. According to Grundy (1988: 92) the military
initiated the intervention in Angola to prevent the MPLA from assuming
power. After much confusion while in Angola, Grundy suggests that BOSS
was successful in ensuring the withdrawal of South African troops on the
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grounds that their presence resulted in some African countries,
previously unsympathetic to the MPLA, changing their position.
Furthermore, according to Grundy, there were other allegations of
clashes between van den Bergh and Botha over defence and foreign
affairs. Vorster was reported to have taken a conciliatory line on the
Frelimo government in Mozambique and offered aid to repair the railways
and harbours. In the meantime, Botha allegedly was backing
counterrevolutionaries from a base near Komatipoort. Van den Bergh, on
hearing about this apparently sent some of his men to Nelspruit and
Komatipoort to immobilize equipment destined for Mozambique. Similarly,
Dr. Eschel Rhoodie reported that Botha attempted to send troops to
Rhodesia after Vorster had distanced South Africa from Smith's
government and was foiled by van den Bergh who informed Vorster. Thus,
van den Bergh had 'openly challenged the man who was to become the next
Prime Minister on matters of intelligence, strategy and foreign policy*
(Grundy 1988: 43). This situation probably had much to do with the
antagonism between Botha and van den Bergh which erupted in the
"Information Scandal".
Although the tensions between the security apparatuses were the most
publicised, there were other conflicts within the state and NP during
Vorster's administration which proved to be very significant. As early
as 1967 two groupings had emerged, the 'verligtes' and 'verkramptes'
(Giliomee 1983: 217).* The former group 'advocated greater white unity
and harmonious race relations through mixed sport and the abolition of
petty apartheid measures' while the latter 'championed undiluted
Afrikaner domination and racial exclusiveness'. Furthermore, the
verkramptes, while they were still members of the party, formed an
internal opposition within a whole range of institutions against the
cautious, more open policy of the leadership.
Modifications to the separate development blue-print had become
necessary in the light of rapid economic growth during the 1960*s as
well as the emergence of anomalies in the policy with certain features
of South Africa not fitting into the model. Thus, attempts were made to
modify job reservation and with the widespread strikes of 1973 in
Durban, the process of restructuring labour relations was set in motion.
At a constitutional level too, important changes were proposed and the
origins of the present tri-cameral system can be traced back to this
period.
In February 1975, Vorster (Hansard 1975: Cols 383-5) outlined NP policy
over the last three decades. The first decade involved separating
groups who had over the years been allowed to intermingle. The second
decade focussed on separate development while the third decade marked
the policy of multi-nationalism. This involved consulting with leaders
from Black, Coloured and Indian communities premised on the preservation
of white sovereignty. Vorster (Hansard 1975: (Col. 390) went on to
restate his position on Coloureds and Indians which was put forward in
Parliament in 1954 when Coloureds were disenfranchised by stating that
"We are going to be faced with a dilemma in this connection in future;
we are going to create Parliaments for the Coloured and the Indians and
we are going to be faced with the dilemma that sovereign Parliaments
cannot exist side by side in the same country." In other words, for
Vorster, the mid 1970's marked the time to confront these questions head
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on, and stated (Hansard 1975: Col. 392) that "they (Coloured and
Indians) had every right not only to ask that (for meaningful political
power) from me but also, in fact to demand it from me....".
In this same session of Parliament, Vorster (Hansard 1975: Col. 394-7)
made reference to a Cabinet Committee as well as other boards such as
the Economic Advisory Council in which Coloured and Indians would be
represented. It was a month after these announcements in Parliament
that Vorster (in Kriek 1976: 77-8) at public meetings clarified these
proposals. He stated that while each group (Coloured, Indian and White)
would decide on issues which affected it, there were also issues of
mutual concern which would be decided by a proposed Cabinet Committee on
which all groups would be represented. He later, in October, said that
if there was no consensus on the Cabinet Committee, then the Chairman,
in line with Cabinet procedure would formulate the final decision.
Soon after these announcements, South Africa was rocked by the eruption
of Soweto in June 1976. Although this event marked a turning point in
Black resistance and the state's response to it, the impulse to
constitutional change had already begun. Furthermore, toward the end of
1976, the Cabinet appointed a Cabinet Committee under the chairmanship
of P.W. Botha, the Cape leader of the N.P. , the Minister of Defence and
previously the Minister of both Coloured Affairs and Community
Development (1961-66), to investigate adjustments to the existing
constitution. In August 1977, a new constitutional plan was announced
at an NP caucus meeting and was endorsed by the four NP provincial
congresses while the proposals had been presented to the Coloured
Representatives Council and South African Indian Council. Because the
new constitutional plan was announced so close to the appointment of the
Cabinet Committee, it would be fair to assume that a set of concrete
proposals had been circulated some years previously among influential
state functionaries whose opinions had to be canvassed and their consent
granted. Indeed, a Broderbond document dated September 1977 (in Strydom
and Wilkins 1980: 173) stated that the new constitutional proposals had
been 'presented to responsible friends long before the plans were
announced'.
The close proximity of the new proposals to the Soweto Uprising has led
some commentators (Stultz 1983: 289, Lewis 1987: 279) to suggest that
the latter was the cause of the former in that it forced Whites to
consider the need for constitutional change. However, because the
search for a new constitution had begun prior to June 1976, this process
can only be explained in terms of the logic of separate development.
Thus, the policy of separate development was premised on the
understanding that there were geographic areas which were the
traditional territories of the different African peoples and it was in
these areas that the various groups were to pursue their own social,
cultural and economic development. The position of 'Coloureds' and
Indians, in this framework was anomalous as there was no fixed
geographic area which could strongly and historically be linked to the
'Coloured' and Indian communities. The new constitutional plans
announced in 1977, were an attempt to resolve this anomaly within the
framework of separate development by attempting to incorporate the
Coloured Representatives Council (CRC) and the South African Indian
council (SAIC) into some national governmental framework.
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The proposals were rejected by both the CRC and SAIC soon after their
announcement and it is worth presenting them in outline to facilitate
a comparison with the 1983 tri-cameral constitution. They entailed the
establishment of three separate Houses of Parliament, for Whites,
'Coloureds' and Indians which would be empowered to legislate on matters
of their individual concern. On the other hand, matters of mutual
concern would be dealt with by a Council of Cabinets on which all three
groups would be represented with legislation being adopted by consensus.
In terms of population figures, a ratio of 4 (White): 2 (Coloured): 1
(Indian) was put forward for membership of all new bodies. At the same
time, power would be placed in the hands of an Executive President who
would be elected by an Electoral College of 88 members, 50 of whom would
be White, 25 'Coloured' and 13 Indian. The members of the electoral
college would be elected by majority vote in each house thereby enabling
the majority party in each house to dominate this institution. Clearly
the dominant party in the 'White' house would be able to elect the
President although each separate house would have its own Prime Minister
all of whom would have the same status and receive the same pay. Other
aspects of the proposals referred to the constitution of a President's
Council, a non-parliamentary advisory body, made up of 20 members
elected by the White parliament and 10 and 5 by the 'Coloured' and
Indian houses respectively. A further 20 members would be appointed by
the State President on the basis of their expertise in the various
fields. The President's Council would replace the Senate while the
Departments of Coloured Relations and of Indian Affairs would be
abolished. It was also suggested that White Provincial Councils would
be phased out and replaced by White regional councils while 3 'Coloured'
and 2 Indian regional councils would also be established. Finally, each
area or town that qualified for municipal status would have 3 separate
municipalities for the 3 racial groups, each with its own mayor and
administration.
In terms of urban Africans, 1978 was to mark the year when the policy of
separate development was to have been completely implemented. However,
it is worth noting that Vorster (Hansard 1975: Col 386-7) with the
Minister of Bantu Administration had already met with some urban
Africans to discuss issues such as commerce, home ownership and freedom
of movement after which the Prime Minister promised to investigate ways
of loosening the restrictions on freehold property ownership.
Although the Soweto Uprising had little to do with the new
constitutional proposals, it certainly forced a major rethink of policy
towards urban Africans. In October 1976, some three months after the
uprising, Gerrit Viljoen (in Strydom and Wilkins 1980: 202) in his
chairman's address to the Broederbond acknowledged that Africans were a
permanent feature of urban South Africa and stated that 'No matter how
successful the homelands are, there will still be hundreds of thousands
of blacks in white cities' locations and certain minimum comforts are
essential such as home ownership, a better physical environment,
services like lights, water, sanitation, trading facilities, sport and
recreation. The cost can be covered by taxes, rents or the money paid
for houses and it is not necessary for everything to be given to them.'
This statement marked a decisive shift from previous policy concerning
urban Africans and the restructuring of township government began in
1978.
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The government suspended the reform initiative due to the proposals
being rejected by the CRC and SAIC, its attempts to stabilize the
townships and, most importantly, infighting within the NP and state.
Conflicts which had been brewing since the early 1970's erupted in
1977/8 when Vorst'er instigated investigations into the abuse of secret
funds which was made possible by his 'chairman of the board' approach to
government facilitating departmental autonomy. Prior to Vorster's
resignation in October 1978, van den Bergh retired, after being firmly
castigated by the Erasmus Commission. However, before retiring van den
Bergh used the Official Secrets Act to intimidate reporters working on
the case and on the eve of the election of the new NP leader was, at the
last minute, prevented from announcing that his investigations had shown
no irregularities in the Department of Information. Such an
announcement would probably have cleared the way for Mulder in the
election (Gilliomee 1983: 204, 208; Day and Rees 1980: 71-7) although
P.W Botha finally won by a mere 24 votes.
Within one year, P.W. Botha began to reorganize the structure and
institutions of the state. However, before discussing these
developments, it is important to note that this process
institutionalised the informal centralization of power in the executive
of the last twenty years (cf Gilliomee 1983: 206). Moreover, Botha's
ascendency in the party marked a return to the Verwoerd style of
leadership - strict hierarchies and command structures. According to
Gilliomee (1983: 205) Botha, unlike Verwoerd and Vorster, bound people
to him through their commitment to the machine and 'ultimately to him as
its personification1. Furthermore, Botha has a reputation (from his
rise in the Cape branch of the NP) for being an 'authoritarian leader
with a zest for overpowering or eliminating his opponents politically'.
Botha was also reknown for organizational and administrative ability.
Gilliomee's comments, made a decade ago, have been verified by,
especially, the most recent actions of P.W. Botha, now the State
President.
P.W. IN POWER
Between 1978 and 1983, Botha consolidated his position and oversaw state
restructuring as well as policy proposals. This period is often
referred to as the reform era characterised by 'Total Strategy'. What
follows will suggest that in fact this period marks the implementation
of policies and ideas (not without some changes) whose origins can be
traced back to the 1960's. Three main areas of restructuring can be
identified: administrative, security and constitutional.
As Grundy (1988: 35) points out Vorster's rule was an organizational and
administrative nightmare. There were twenty permanent cabinet
committees which met on an ad hoc basis and thirty nine government
departments. Because Vorster did not assert his control there was
institutional autonomy and the lack of co-ordination of activities as
well as severe in-fighting. Botha reduced the number of cabinet
committees to five and later four, National Security (SSC),
Constitutional Affairs, Economic Affairs and Social Affairs and
regularized their meetings. Unlike the SSC, the other cabinet
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committees were not constitutionally constituted and their composition
is not publicly known. Geldenhuys and Kotze (1983: 39) go on to argue
that since 1979, cabinet committees have been empowered to make
decisions and therefore are not mere advisory bodies to the cabinet but
integral components of the highest decision making machinery. At the
same time, Botha reduced the number of government departments from
thirty nine to twenty two although at present there are around thirty.
The security apparatuses were also restructured by Botha although many
of the recommendations of the earlier commissions, especially the
establishment of the NSMS and Joint Management Centres (JMC's), were
implemented in 1979. In the same year, the structure of the SSC was
also modified when a secretariat was instituted. A working committee of
the SSC was established consisting of senior representatives from the
departments permanently a part of the SSC. The secretariat, headed by
the secretary of the SSC as well as the working committee are able to
'shape agendas, develop position papers, formulate alternatives, take
and circulate minutes, and, once the SSC and the cabinet have acted, to
see to it that each operational department and bureau knows what is
expected of it, that decisions are circulated to the relevant officials,
and that co-operation and co-ordination are assured' (Grundy 1988: 53).
The secretariat has 4 branches: Strategy, National Intelligence
Interpretation, Strategic Communication and Administration. Finally,
under Botha, the SSC meets fortnightly and its meetings precede cabinet
meetings. Furthermore, the SSC meets when Parliament is in recess and
when the cabinet is inactive.
As soon as Botha became Prime Minister, he assumed control of the
Department of National Security (DONS) the new name for BOSS and began
to downgrade its influence as it was the power-base of van den Bergh.
In 1980, DONS was renamed National Intelligence Services (NIS) and Niel
Barnard, a Professor of Political Science from the University of the
Orange Free State, was made its head (cf Financial Mail, 04/07/82).
Botha also demarcated the areas of activity in which the intelligence
institutions operated and this had crucial implications for the SSC.
MIS, although empowered to operate internally, was given foreign affairs
as its priority. The Security Police focussed on gathering intelligence
on internal security. Both these organizations were supposed to give
their intelligence to NIS which acted as an interpretation unit. The
fact that it does not officially engage in intelligence gathering
indicates the way that it has been downgraded. Grundy reports that even
to this day, there are deep antagonisms between the 3 aparatuses
concerning status, areas of operation and the withholding of
information. The establishment of NIS is important in that it, as
announced by P.W. Botha in 1984, dominates the secretariat of the SSC
although the secretary over the last decade has been associated with
MIS. This is important as the secretariat acts as the link between the
SSC and the outside world and, if the conflicts between the intelligence
gathering agencies are as intense and competitive as reported, then, due
to the possibility of information being held within certain aparatuses,
the SSC acts with uneven information at its disposal (Geldenhuys and
Kotze 1983: 40). Nonetheless, as Geldenhuys and Kotze point out, the
SSC is the most important decision making institution in the state and
its field of concern has been broadened to include just about every
sphere of internal and external concerns.
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In emphasizing the importance of the SSC, it is important not to ignore
a whole range of other institutions which influence the formulation and
implementation of policies. The various cabinet committees have already
been mentioned. Also important are the various government departments,
the Presidents' Council and its various sub-committees especially the
committee on constitutional affairs, the judiciary and parliament.
While there are a number of SADF personnel on the SSC, it is important
to bear in mind that because the SSC is the only committee established
by Parliament it is still legally responsible to Parliament. At the
same time, one should not underestimate the professional ethic of the
military whereby it claims to separate itself from civilian affairs. At
the same time, the tradition of white parliamentary politics should not
be ignored as a constraint on the military actually intervening in
politics. There is no doubt that Botha has firm connections with the
military due to him having been Minister of Defence from 1966 to 1980
(as well as head of NIS until October 1980 and in charge of National
Security until March 1980) when he was succeeded by General Malan.
However, this does not mean that the military necessarily plays an
important role in policy formation although J.,t does play an important
role in supporting and implementing policy.
This point is illustrated when examining the constitutional proposals
culminating in the tri-cameral parliament. As Grundy (1988:40) points
out, the constitutional proposals go beyond the military and its
manpower needs and should be situated in the context of the larger
issues of political structure and executive authority. This process, as
argued previously, can be identified in both Verwoerd and Vorsters1
administrations. Similarly, it has been argued (O'Meara 1982) that the
reforms announced in the early 1980's mark the merger of the NP with big
business with the former implementing policy to satisfy the demands of
the latter. The Carlton and Good Hope Conferences (November 1979 and
November 1981 respectively) are cited as evidence of this rapprochement.
However, as Gilliomee (1983: 131-4) shows, these meetings in no way
indicate business pressurizing government for reform as they promised
their co-operation without specifying demands nor requesting information
on future proposals. Indeed, Nolutshungu (1982: 105-9) insists that
private capital had not vigourously agitated for change and that 'If the
bourgeoisie rules in South Africa, it is only in the sense that all
South African governments have sought, and now seek, to maintain and
defend the system of capitalism ...'. In other words, business,
historically, has operated within the confines of NP policy implying
that the interests of Afrikaners and whites as well as those of business
are, in a tension ridden way, protected by the state. As,long as the
state has the institutional means to secure its tax base it need
not be overly sensitive to the needs of business and, similarly, capital
need not necessarily be unhappy with state policy so long as it is able
to accumulate. In any event, there is no necessary reason why political
reform should translate into economic growth.
Thus the new constitution needs to be analysed in the context of the
anomalies in the policy of separate development and conflicts within the
state and NP. In early 1978, Vorster suspended the 1977 proposals drawn
up by the Cabinet Committee chaired by P.W. Botha on the grounds that
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wider consultations be engaged in (Stultz 1983: 291). This event has
been interpreted as a sign of Vorster and his close associates backing
down on reform in an attempt to hold the NP together (Gilliomee 1982:
11). However, after the 'Info Scandal' had erupted with P.W. emerging
as the new Prime Minister, the new cabinet was more sympathetic to the
proposals which were referred to a parliamentary select committee.
This committee was soon transformed into the Schlebusch Commission
which, after hearing evidence and receiving memoranda, submitted an
interim report in May 1980. It modified the proposals of the Botha
committee and made four recommendations, the most important being the
decision to pass the proposals onto a new advisory body to be called the
President's Council which would replace the Senate and came into being
with effect from January 1, 1981.
The President's Council, under the chairmanship of Denis Worral, began
work on a new constitution and, after processing the written memoranda
and oral testimony submitted to it, accepted a First Report in May 1982.
In July, Prime Minister Botha announced at the Federal congress of the
NP that the government, after long consultations, had a constitutional
plan which it was prepared to back. In November, the President's
Council submitted a Second Report 'on the adaptation of constitutional
structures in South Africa'. These constitutional proposals were
introduced in Parliament in May 1983 and in November, the opinion of the
white electorate, by way of a referendum, was surveyed. The proposals
were soon enacted into law by Parliament and elections were held in 1984
in terms of the new tri-cameral constitution.
There is a large amount of overlap between the 1977 proposals and the
1983 constitution (cf Stultz 1983: 295-6). . Instead of three separate
governments operating at a national level, each of the legislative
chambers are part of the same parliament. This change could be seen as
an attempt to circumvent the problems of separate parliaments identified
by Vorster in 1975. Each house now would be able to legislate on
matters specific to it called 'own affairs' while a general consensus
was required for matters of general concern, 'general affairs', to be
enacted. Instead of a cabinet committee with white veto rights, as in
the 1977 proposals, which would resolve differences, a restructured
President's Council would act as arbitrator. The 1982 split in the NP
with the Transvaal leader Andries Treurnicht leaving and subsequently
forming the Conservative Party should be understood in terms of the new
constitution enabling non-whites to have a say in white affairs. This
was not the case with the earlier three parliament proposals accepted by
all the provincial NP caucuses. Nonetheless, the President's Council
was constituted in accordance with the 4:2:1 formula as in the early
proposals and was empowered to resolve disputes as well as establish
committees to advise the President on a whole range of issues.
Under the new constitution, the State President would be elected by an
electoral college consisting of all three houses, again according to the
4:2:1 formula, thereby insuring that the House of Assembly and the
ruling party within it would in all likelihood dominate the electoral
college and get its candidate into office. The State President, now
P.W. Botha, need not be a member of parliament and he is empowered to
appoint representatives not only to the President's Council but also to
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the cabinet and such appointees also need not be members of parliament.
Indeed, the tri-cameral constitution consolidates the process of
executive government which had begun with the restructuring of the
cabinet committees and the security apparatuses in that those who hold
high positions in government are not directly elected by voters.
The idea of White, 'Coloured' and Indian regional councils mooted in the
1977 plan were suspended and the idea only becomes relevant with the
establishment of regional services councils later. However, although
Africans are excluded from constitutional restructuring at a national
level, important developments were occuring at a local level.
Institutions, such as the Bantu Administration Boards and Community
Councils had been established in the early and late 1970's respectively
to facilitate township administration. The Community Councils were
representative bodies and elections were held in 1978 although the polls
were low indicating that the state's attempts via the Department of
Co-operation and Development to legitimate local level government after
the Soweto Uprising had not succeeded. This, as well as the way the
Councils were ultimately subordinated to the Boards, resulted in a new
formula being attempted in the Bantu Local Authorities Act of 1982. The
Black Local Authorities {BLA's) were intended to be more autonomous from
central government concerning the generation and allocation of resources
and this fitted in with some of the Riekert Commission's recommendations
on demarcating between permanent urban dwellers and outsiders.
BLA elections were scheduled for 1983 and coincided with the
announcement of broader constitutional reform. The percentage polls in
these elections were slightly higher than the 1978 figures although too
low to signify any form of legitimacy for these structures.
Furthermore, soon after entering into office, rents and services charges
were increased to enable the provision of further services as the long
established principle of African townships being self-financing was
entrenched in these new institutions. The imposition of this new
structure of township administration sparked off the most sustained and
intense rebellion of Africans against local level government - a
rebellion which was fuelled by national anti-tri-cameral organizations
such as the UDF and NF.
Although the percentage polls in the 1984 tri-cameral elections for the
'Coloured' and Indian houses were low, the structures remained intact
and were set in motion by those' who had participated. This was not the
case with the BLA's where councillors were attacked and forced to leave
the areas resulting in their collapse.
This, as Humphries (1988: 105-118) points out, resulted in the state
responding at two levels, constitutional and security.
The Regional Services council Act of 1985 is the cornerstone of the most
recent attempt to restructure African local government. First,
responsibility for monitoring the Black Local Authorities Act was given
to the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning (DCDP) with
the Minister, Chris Heunis, in charge. Second, by integrating BLA's
into a general affairs structure, the DCDP was hoping to improve the
legitimacy of the BLA's. Third, there was a general consensus in
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government that the BLA's needed resources to resolve their political
problems. Thus, the DCDP took over and adapted the Browne Committee
report of 1981 which was originally commissioned by the Minister of
Finance to investigate the financing of white municipalities. The
Browne Committee, working within the framework of separate White,
'Coloured' and Indian regional councils as set out in the 1977
constitutional proposals, called for the provision of 'services on a
cost effective basis, while also advocating the redistribution of local
government income from the White municipalities to Indian and 'Coloured1
local authority structures.' Thus, the Regional Services councils
(RSC's) are an attempt to incorporate Africans, Whites, 'Coloureds' and
Indians into a decision making structure co-ordinating the activities of
all local authorities as well as effecting a redistribution of finance
for socio-economic development and the establishment of infrastructure.
The security response to the collapse of BLA's and township militancy is
multi-facetted. First, it involved a high profile security force
presence in the townships with the SADF being initially used in a
supportive role under police supervision. Second, there were strong
suggestions that the UDF was to be banned in late 1984 when the former
Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grange, linked the UDF to the ANC
and SACP (Die Beeld 6/10/84). The UDF later denied such links and
reasseerted its commitment to peaceful change (Die Beeld 11/10/84).
There were, however, two reasons why the UDF was not banned at this
point in time. First, office bearers of the UDF had canvassed support
for the organization in Europe and the United Nations while the sit-in
at the British Consulate in Durban highlighted the activities of the
UDF. Second, and more important, the state accepted the proposals of
the then Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee, a Political
Science graduate and part-time lecturer. He advocated a strategy of
containment whereby organizations be continuously disrupted by removing
leadership while exploiting tensions within in order to prevent such
organizations from going underground where they could not be controlled
(Star 31/05/87; Die Suid Afrikaan No 14 April/Mei 1988). This approach
was unsuccessful and, in the light of the intensification of the
township rebellions, a partial state of emergency was declared in July
1985 indicating a return to the more conventional methods of mass
detentions and general repression.
Despite the state of emergency, members of the British Commonwealth, in
October 1985, proposed a visit to South Africa in an attempt to set up a
platform for negotiating a resolution of the political conflicts in
South Africa. This idea was accepted by Botha in December with two
provisos: First, that the Commonwealth Mission did not prescribe
solutions. Second that it accept that the government was determined to
proceed with its reform initiative premised on power sharing and subject
to the protection of the rights of minority groups. Botha stressed that
negotiations to achieve this end should begin in earnest (Commonwealth
Report 1986: 148).
Thus, with both the ANC (February 1985) and the government agreeing to
negoitate, the Commonwealth Mission came to South Africa in the form of
the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on 2 March 1986 and the state of
emergency was lifted five days later.
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In a nutshell, the EPG drew up a document which was first presented to
the government on the procedure for legalizing the ANC in order to
participate in negotiations after suspending the armed struggle. The
government neither accepted nor rejected these proposals although
Mandela, speaking as an individual, accepted the proposals as a starting
point when they were presented to him on May 16. He argued that he
could not speak on behalf of the ANC without consultations with other
office bearers. Meanwhile, Tambo, in Lusaka, provisionally accepted the
proposals when they too were presented to him one day later although he
raised questions concerning the South African government's honesty. On
the morning of May 19, two days after consulting with Tambo, the EPG
heard a report on the radio that the SADF had successfully carried out
raids on 'ANC bases' in Harare, Gaberone and Lusaka. The announcement
of the raids was made immediately prior to the EPG's scheduled meeting
with the Cabinet Constitutional Committee in Cape Town. The EPG
acknowledged that the raids cast doubt on the government's attitude
towards negotiation but still met with the Cabinet Committee. The EPG
also noted that the government reasserted its demand for a one-sided
renunciation of violence and that while talking about negotiations and
peaceful solutions, it had been planning these armed attacks. Some ten
days later, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'Pik' Botha, sent a letter
to the EPG where the government's position on negotiations was clearly
outlined. It reaffirmed the principles of minority rights and power
sharing and concluded by stating that 'The South African government is
prepared to negotiate with South African citizens about a new
constitutional dispensation which will provide for power sharing. It is
not interested in negotiation about a transfer of power'. The EPG later
acknowledged that further talks on negotiation would not 'lead anywhere
in the current circumstances' (Commonwealth Report 1986: 101-125).
The collapse of the EPG mission brings to light underlying tensions
within the state. Apparently, there were two camps on the question of
legalizing and negotiating with the ANC: On the one hand were General
Coetzee and the Foreign Affairs and NIS bureacrats who favoured the
unpredictable path of negotiation politics. On the other hand were the
generals in the SADF as well as Security Police officials. Thus, the
raids on the neighbouring states, authorised by P.W. Botha, wrecked the
talks but also demonstrated the SADF's growing role in both domestic and
regional policy making (Africa Confidential Vol 29 No 12: 17 June 1988).
The aftermath of the EPG mission also resulted in the reform minded bloc
within the state becoming marginalised.
Two weeks after the collapse of the EPG mission a second state of
emergency was declared on 12 June 1986. This marked the final demise of
General Coetzee (he retired one year early) who was blamed by some
within the state for the township unrest because of his elaborate ideas.
It was thought that if the UDF was 'nipped in the bud' , the declaration
of two states of emergency could have been avoided (Africa Confidential
Vol 29 No 12: 17 June 1988; Die Suid Afrikaan No 14 April/Mei 1988; Star
31/05/87).
Nonetheless, the SADF had come to the fore with the second state of
emergency with the then Secretary of the SSC, General van der Westhuizen
and the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, giving an assurance that they
would restore law and order in the townships if the military as opposed
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to the police controlled this state of emergency (Die Suid Afrikaan No
14 April/Mei 1988; Africa Confidential vol 29 No 12: 17 June 1988). It
was further reported that the SADF were not impressed by what they
considered the Police's unimaginative, ill-discplined and heavy-handed
actions against unrest.
Soon after the declaration of the state of emergency, the UDF was
declared an affected organization meaning that it was prevented from
receiving foreign funds. This indicated the re-emergence of the view
that the extra-parliamentary opposition should be restrained. The UDF
later appealed against this measure in the Natal Supreme Court and it
was overturned in May 1987. It was expected that the state would appeal
although it never instituted proceedings (Natal Mercury 9/5/87).
Towards the end of 1986, a new theory of township unrest emerged within
state circles. It was now thought that 'radicals' instigated unrest by
mobilising communities around legitimate socio-economic grievances (cf
Louis Le Grange in the Star 5/10/86; Magnus Malan in Die Suid Afrikaan:
Winter 1986). This resulted in the elucidation of the three phase
approach to counter-revolution articulated by the Minister of Law and
Order, Adriaan Vlok (Leadership vol 6 No 1 1987) although probably
devised by NIS. The first stage was the re-establishment of law and
order and the NSMS was activated and its various subcommittees were
integral to this task. As one security official put it (referring to
the NSMS) 'It was all there. All we did with the state of emergency was
to hit the switch1 (Newsweek: June 20, 1988). The second phase was
socio-economic upliftment of the townships to improve the quality of
life of residents as well as to remove the issues around which
'radicals' mobilised the communities. The RSC's were central to this
aspect of the strategy as they were to provide the resources for this
reconstruction. At the same time, various state departments and
parastatals made resources available for this task. The third phase was
constitutional development and, although no concrete proposals were put
forward, this presumably meant moving in the direction indicated in
'Pik' Botha's letter to the EPG.
The first and second phases illustrate the JMC's role of co-ordinating
the allocation of resources coupled with coercion in an attempt to
remove volatile issues and situations in townships while buying
political support at the same time. As one SSC general said "These
people have their aspirations, of course, but they are really concerned
about bread-and-butter issues - housing, schools, motor cars, 'the good
life1. And if you want their support, you can buy it" (Newsweek June
20, 1988). Thus, while the DCDP attempted to legitimate local
government through representative participation and the allocation of
resources, the security people in the NSMS believed that legitimacy
could be bought by simply, and in a clandesitne way, allocating
resources to satisfy the communities basic material needs.
The security forces' attempts to re-establish law and order coupled with
the strategic allocation of resources began to show signs of success.
By early 1987, the townships had stabilized quite considerably and Botha
called an election for the House of Assembly. The NP fought a vicious
security oriented campaign which severly affected its left-wing
opposition. At the same time, the CP became the official opposition and
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its programme of defending the rights of whites to determine their own
future received much support, catching many commentators unawares.
Soon after the election, a CP Member of Parliament asked the Minister of
Justice, Kobie Coetzee, to state whether the government was considering
declaring the UDF an unlawful organization. The Minister responded by
stating that the situation was being monitored by 'the government
institutions and functionaries which are concerned with security
matters' and that it will not be in the interests of effective handling
of such cases to furnish the type of information requested (House of
Assembly General Affairs, Question No 10 18 August 1987).
For the rest of 1987, the state continued to enforce the state of
emergency while considering its tactical options vis a vis the
extra-parliamentary opposition which had been severely affected by the
concerted action against it.
In February 1988, the state made its move. Despite internal cleavages
in the security apparatuses, with the 'Winning Hearts and Minds' (WHAM)
faction in the military consolidating above the orthodox counter
insurgency (COIN) group with the appointment of Charles Lloyd as
Secretary of the SSC after van der Westhuizen was sent to Chile as South
Africa's ambassador (Africa Confidential Vol 29 No 12, 17 June 1988; Die
Suid Afrikaan No 14 April/Mei 1988), the state exhibited a large degree
of coherence in its actions. It was also reported that the police began
to assert themselves in the SSC and NSMS after Minister Vlok; the new
Commissioner of Police; General de Witt and the Head of the Security
Police, General van der Merwe, forcefully promoted the police with a new
image in state circles.
On February 10, Vlok announced that despite the success of the security
forces in containing unrest, there was still a climate of revolution in
the country (Star 11/02/88). Some ten days later, Botha announced the
restrictions on seventeen extra-parliamentary organizations (Star
25/02/88). This announcement coincided with Botha's address to a
by-election meeting in the Standerton constituency. There were two
other by-elections scheduled and it was expected that the CP would win
all three. Both Vlok and General van der Merwe justified the
restrictions on the grounds that organizations had realised that armed
conflict and violence would not achieve their goals and therefore began
to implement other strategies such as mobilising the masses and making
the country ungovernable (Star 25/02/88).
Now the state's own statistics had shown that the levels of township
political activity had dropped considerably and that many of the
activities mentioned by Vlok and van der Merwe were characteristic of
the 1984-6 period and had not occured for some time. Thus, the
justification for the restrictions which effectively banned the
organizations, although they could appeal for permission to engage in
certain activities, is open to question and an alternative explanation
can be put forward.
It is believed that there was unanimity in the Cabinet on the need for
action against the extra-parliamentary opposition (Sundy Star 28/02/88).
However, the restrictions should be seen as an attempt by the state to
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prevent the re-emergence and consolidation of community organizations
around a boycott of the October municipal elections thereby nullifying
the effects of the state of emergency. After the 1983-4 experience, the
state recognizes that the boycott is a powerful mobilizing tactic and
wants to prevent a high profile anti-local authority campaign under the
banners of the various organizations. The then Minister of
Constitutional Development and Planning, Stoffel van der Merwe, did
acknowledge that the possibility of extra-parliamentary groups
participating in the elections was taken into account in implementing
the restrictions. However, he later acknowledged that Archie Gumede had
raised the question of participation and that 'that argument was not
winning the day in the UDF' (The High Road April 1988). This statement
confirmed the view, present at the time of the announcement of the
restrictions, that participation was not on the oppositions' agenda at
that moment in time (Sunday Star 28/02/88).
There are two facets to the imposition of the restrictions premised on
the expectation of a boycott of local authority elections (cf Magnus
Mai an in The Weekly Mail May 20-26 1988), an expectation confirmed by
the extra-parliamentary opposition after the announcement (Weekly Mail
June 10-16 1988). First, the state wants to clear the way for those who
wish to participate either as candidates or as voters in October to do
so. The state wants to ensure that the elections are a success as they
would then legitimate the restructuring of local government into RSCs.
Furthermore, successful elections would facilitate the restructuring of
township administration and more recently it was announced that African
local authorities would act as an electoral college for representatives
on proposed second tier governmental structures. Thus, the state wants
to create and maintain by force a space for participation by excluding
opponents. In this context, the 20:30:50 formula circulating in state
circles whereby 20% of the population are seen as 'radical1, 30%
moderate and 50% undecided is informing state action (Die Suid Afrikaan
No 14 April/Mei 1988; Africa Confidential Vol 29 No 12, 17 June 1988).
The state believes that by isolating the 'radicals' it can draw the
moderates in via the allocation of resources and propoganda resulting in
many of the 'undecideds' following.
The second aspect of the restrictions is far more subtle. The idea of
acting against the extra-parliamentary opposition has been around in
state circles for some time. However, instead of banning the
organizations outright, the state is attempting to force them onto the
defensive. By claiming that at present they are engaged in activities
which threaten public safety the state is saying that if they cease such
activities and participate in democratic and legal activities they will
be allowed to do so - hence the clause in the restrictions enabling
permission to be granted for engaging in certain activities. Thus, the
state is saying that only activities around participation will be
acceptable knowing that a boycott was imminent enabling the state to
claim that the extra-parliamentary opposition only has itself to blame
for its effective banning. At the same time, by forcing the
extra-parliamentary opposition to declare that it will not participate
in the elections, the state can claim that it has no interest in
negotiation and therefore is beyond the law.
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This attempt to define 'politics' as participation in state structures
means, by implication, that all other activities are illegitimate. This
has important implications for the recently announced new constitutional
proposals (the third phase) which, inter alia, allow for the appointment
of Africans onto the Cabinet, the establishment of regional structures
for Africans outside of the Bantustans and the setting up of a National
Council to advise the government on the drafting of a new constitution
which would protect the interests of minority groups on the basis of
power sharing and non-domination. In other words, the state, at the
time of the EPG Mission, did have some ideas on constitutional reform
although it delayed announcing them until it had regained control of the
townships.
At the time of the announcement of these proposals, Minister Heunis
stated that 'those who wanted to negotiate with the government could do
so while those who wanted to remain outside could stay there' (Star
22/04/88). The new Minister of Information, Stoffel van der Merwe, made
a similar although more sinister and revealing statement when he
asserted that 'once the perception that a black government is attainable
in the near future - once that perception has been thoroughly crushed,
it.will become more possible to speak again about a common future' and
'what we are saying through our words and actions is that there is no
future in black government in South Africa1. Finally, the Minister
concluded by stating that 'In time we will get a sufficient number of
prominent leaders to participate in the democratic game so that
eventually those who still lust after revolution will become as
irrelevant in South Africa as they are are in the US or Britain* (The
High Road April 1988).
In other words, the state is making it quite clear that it is attempting
to crush and marginalise all those who do not accept its constitutional
vision for the future. The press restrictions and proposed Orderly
Internal Politics Bill are further attempts by the state to isolate the
opposition ideologically and economically as the latter would limit and
control the amount of foreign funding for organizations. The state is
clearly trying to force the opposition into a corner where it will have
few, if any, options if it does not accept the state's proposals and it
is in this context that the question of possible responses becomes
important.
While the internal opposition is hamstrung with the redeclared state of
emergency making it a serious offence to propogate boycotts of any kind,
the ANC has vowed to disrupt the October elections. Chris Hani recently
stated that 'We shall not allow puppet organisations to put up
candidates' and 'We shall use revolutionary violence to prevent blacks
from collaborating' (The Economist June 18, 1988). However, escalation
of the sabotage campaign with a blurring of the distinction between
'soft' and 'hard' targets could result in a further hardening of white
attitudes as well as alienate African support thereby setting back the
diplomatic victories achieved over the past few years.
Indeed, the debate within extra-parliamentary groups on the possibility
of participating in local authority and tri-cameral elections, as did
the CPSA and ANC in a different context, is important in that such
action would not only catch the state off-guard and disrupt its medium
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to long term strategic thinking but it would also offer the movements
institutionally protected space to operate within. Access to
constitutional procedure could provide the organizations with bargaining
power while it, as opposed to participants not sympathetic to the ideals
of the liberation movements, could use the abundent resources made
available by the state to consolidate a grass-roots support base.
Unfortunately, it may be too late to change direction now as many years
of boycott and non-participation have consolidated a political tradition
among the masses which would require time and organizational as well as
consultative space to redirect - commodities which the
extra-parliamentary opposition do not at the moment possess.
Nonetheless, the October elections mark a major event with the state
determined to win a victory while the extra-parliamentary opposition is
determined to ensure the failure of the state's plans. At this point in
time, it is too early to predict who will succeed.
CONCLUSION
The main object of this paper has been to isolate the way the liberation
movements have conceptualised the state and the strategies that they
have adopted to effect a transition. Changes in strategy have been
identified culminating with the view that the armed struggle coupled
with internal mobilization should be pursued in order to force the
government to the negotiating table. This was then compared with the
state's response to the challenge to it which consisted of a
sophisticated strategy of resource allocation, repression and redefining
of the political terrain of activity. Indeed, the way that the state
has successfully contained the opposition indicates that extra-state
activity is no more advantageous than a strategy which is a combination
of both external mobilization of support and the strategic intervention
in state structures.
NOTES:
1. This legislation, with ammendments, was recently used to severely
restrict the activities of 18 legal extra-parliamentary
opposition organisations.
2. More recently, the endurance of the extra-parliamentary
opposition in the light of the state's offensive can, to a large
degree, be explained by the focus on, and consolidation of, local
level organisation structures.
3. This view was reaffirmed by Mandela (1978: 65) as late as 1958
when he said that 'The principal and most urgent task facing the
Congress Movement today (1958) is the defeat of the Nationalist
Government and its replacement by a less reactionary one. Any
step or decision which helps the movement to obtain this task is
politically correct'.
4. Cf Johns S. (1973) for a critical evaluation of the applicability
of guerilla warfare to South African conditions.
5. Own emphasis.
6. This view is present in Slovo (1973: 339).
7. Cf Lodge (1983b: 164-171) for a discussion of ANC activity prior
to 1976 and its activities related to the Soweto Uprising.
8. Recently, Slovo (The Guardian Weekly 17 August 1986) has
qualified, without shifting from, this view when he claims that
'In general, capitalist exploitation and race domination are not
symbiotically linked. But the historically-evolved connection
between capitalist exploitation and racist domination in South
Africa creates a natural link between national liberation and
social emancipation; a link which is virtually too late to
unravel.'
9. Earlier Slovo (1973: 334) had asserted that 'the more official
policy changes, the more it remains the same'.
10. It was reported in 1986 that Oliver Tambo described the
establishment of Regional Services Councils in similar terms.
11. By early 1980, the Frelimo government in Mozambique had allegedly
advised the ANC to focus on internal activity (Cf Lodge 1983b:
170).
12. This document was cited in the press as it was submitted as
evidence in the Cape Town Supreme Court by the Commissioner of
Police, Generaal Johann Coetzee.
13. The state refers to a system of institutions and apparatuses of
administration, policy formation and implementation and
repression. These institutions evolve historically in the
context of a particular society and reflect and protect the
interests of a dominant group whether capitalist, ethnic or both
in an uneven and conflict-ridden way. There are, furthermore,
tensions and conflicts within institutions due to functionaries
proposing different solutions to the problems of administration
facing each department. There are also conflicts between
institutions due to overlap in areas of administration and
institutional competition and status. While the state impacts
directly on all spheres of daily life (there is no distinction
between state and civil society) due to its defining the
parameters of social intercourse, it is also able to exclude
groups from influencing policy and action mainly by excluding
them from participating in certain processes. Thus, state
restructuring refers to the process whereby there is a
realignment and creation of new institutions which, in turn,
formulate and implement new policies which modify the mechanisms
of exclusion and social regulation.
This view of the state draws upon ideas present in Poulantzas
(1980), Parkin (1979) and Vielle (1988).
14. This presentation of the new model is drawn from South African
Institute of Race Relations (1978: 7-8).
15. Cf Grundy (1983: 37).
16. For an interesting argument that the state is not structurally
dependent on capital Cf Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988: 11-29).
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